Long-term low-emission development strategies (LT-LEDS)
This Action Area covers:
• How Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategies function in practice.
• The entry points for Ministries of Finance.
• How they can integrate into fiscal and investment planning to support decision-making over time.
Context and role of Ministries of Finance
Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDS) are emerging as important instruments for managing economic transformation in response to climate change (2050 Pathways Platforms, 2022). Established under Article 4.19 of the Paris Agreement, LT-LEDS were introduced to help countries connect near-term climate action with longer-term development and decarbonization objectives. To date, around 80 countries have submitted LT-LEDS to the UNFCCC. By setting clear long-term directions, they can provide predictable market signals that encourage firms and investors to commit capital (UNFCCC, 2015; UNFCCC, 2021).
In practice, LT-LEDS are country-driven strategies providing a structured process for analyzing transition pathways in line with the Paris Agreement and their economic implications (2050 Pathways Platform, 2017). They can serve as macroeconomic roadmaps for transition: frameworks through which governments can evaluate risks, identify opportunities, and guide structural transformation over time while aligning climate objectives with broader economic priorities. This broader role is becoming more important as climate transition dynamics begin to reshape trade patterns, investment flows, industrial competitiveness, and fiscal stability (see Part A, The role of Ministries of Finance in navigating the transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient, and nature-positive economy).
LT-LEDS and NDCs can function as complementary parts of a broader planning system
LT-LEDS set the long-term direction and sequencing of transformation, while Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) help translate long-term direction into nearer-term policy and investment. This alignment is particularly important in sectors characterized by long asset lifetimes and significant public investment requirements, such as energy, transport, industry, and urban infrastructure. Decisions in these sectors shape future fiscal liabilities, trade exposure, technological competitiveness, and vulnerability to stranded assets.
Most of the LT‑LEDS submitted to the UNFCCC combine four core elements:
- Net zero or climate neutrality targets, typically aspired to by 2050.
- Sectoral pathways or roadmaps describing the scale and sequencing of structural economic shifts.
- Scenario-based analysis of economic and emissions trajectories and alternative pathways of how economic structures may evolve over time.
- Economic and investment assessments, ranging from indicative cost estimates to more advanced macroeconomic modeling.
More than 90% also include adaptation and climate resilience elements. Together, these elements provide an analytical basis for considering how climate and development objectives interact over time (2050 Pathways Platform, forthcoming).
Countries are increasingly using LT-LEDS to strengthen policy coherence across planning processes
In Chile, climate legislation formally links long-term strategies to NDC cycles and national planning frameworks. In the United Kingdom, long-term climate targets are operationalized through legally binding carbon budgets that guide medium-term policy decisions. In Indonesia, LT-LEDS have informed broader development planning discussions and sectoral transition strategies. In France and across the European Union, long-term strategies are increasingly embedded in wider governance and investment frameworks (2050 Pathways Platform, 2024a; 2050 Pathways Platform, forthcoming).
However, in many countries, short-term economic and fiscal decisions continue to follow existing development patterns even where these may conflict with longer-term transition objectives. As a result, governments can often face the challenge ofbalancing competing development priorities, fiscal constraints, employment concerns, and political economy pressures while managing uncertainty around transition pathways.
LT-LEDS do not resolve these tensions, but they can make trade-offs more visible and provide a structured framework for evaluating alternative pathways and their implications. This includes the core areas of fiscal and macroeconomic management such as public investment, debt sustainability, industrial competitiveness, subsidy systems, and exposure to external shocks.
Box F1a(i).1. Navigating the political economy of engagement
Evidence that countries can reduce emissions at low or even negative cost has not, by itself, produced action. Vested interests, institutional inertia, and short political mandates make climate ambitions difficult to translate into implementation. Further, engagement itself can carry political cost for an MoF: pricing popular policies, acknowledging fiscal constraints on NDC ambitions, or questioning the programs of ministries with stronger political constituencies. Three dynamics recur:
- Interministerial coordination. LT-LEDS can set indicative targets that energy and transport ministries build their plans on, but only where their objectives enter the functional mandates of those ministries. An MoF can use its center-of-government position to argue for such mandates and to make coordination a condition of the budget and financing processes it manages (see Function 2, Using the budget to drive transformation in all sectors of the economy; and Capability 2, Coordination and collaboration for whole-of-economy climate action).
- Subsidy reform. Technical agreement on the merits of rationalizing fossil fuel subsidies does not translate into political willingness to act on NDC or LT-LEDS timelines. Reforms have proved more durable when compensation is sequenced ahead of price increases: issuing social protection and compensation payments before subsidies fall builds public trust that savings will be returned; and showing both the reform and the compensation in public finance reporting helps sustain the coalition behind it (see also Function 2, Transforming economic incentives through carbon pricing, subsidy reform and other fiscal policy measures).
- Electoral cycles. Legislatures are less likely to pass climate laws ahead of elections, and multiple institutional veto points compound this difficulty. Commitments embedded in legal and institutional frameworks persist across administrations. Costa Rica wrote its long-term strategy into national law and linked its milestones to policy-based financing conditions with development partners, giving the MoF and investor groups a direct stake in delivery. A MoF can weigh which legal, financial, or institutional anchors are available in its own context from the earliest stages of strategy design.
Source: Based on a contribution by Richard Sunderland, adapted from World Bank (2023); additional material from Accelerating Climate Adaptation and Mitigation in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Political Economy Guidance Note (World Bank, forthcoming).
Where MoFs are more actively engaged in LT‑LEDS processes, countries can better connect long-term transition analysis with fiscal and investment planning
In South Africa, long-term transition analysis has informed broader discussions around the fiscal and economic implications of coal phase-out, regional employment impacts, and international transition finance under the Just Energy Transition Partnership, ensuring that just transition considerations are considered (PCC, 2022; Republic of South Africa, 2022). In The Gambia, collaboration between the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs during the LT‑LEDS process strengthened coordination around development planning and external finance mobilization (UNFCCC, 2024).
LT-LEDS can support MoFs in at least three ways
Evaluating macroeconomic implications
First, the analytical processes underpinning LT-LEDS often include macroeconomic modeling, sectoral analysis, and cost-benefit assessments that allow governments to compare impacts on growth, employment, fiscal balances, trade, and welfare outcomes under different scenarios. In Jamaica, integrated modeling has been used to assess economy-wide impacts associated with long-term transition pathways (2050 Pathways Platform, 2026). In Ethiopia, analysis linked to long-term low-carbon development planning has highlighted potential employment and growth gains associated with lower-carbon development trajectories. Analysis underpinning Indonesia’s long-term strategy suggested that low-carbon development pathways could support substantial job creation and poverty reduction over the long term.
Similarly, in North Macedonia, modeling exercises associated with long-term planning have suggested that more ambitious transition pathways could support job creation in emerging sectors, although distributional and adjustment challenges remain significant (2050 Pathways Platform, 2022). LT-LEDS are also a natural home for long-run distributional and just transition modeling. South Africa’s Presidential Climate Commission has embedded this analysis in long-term transition planning, giving the National Treasury an evidence base for sequencing support to affected workers and regions (PCC, 2022; Republic of South Africa, 2022).
Managing transition risks
Second, by using long-term scenarios and sectoral analysis, governments can better understand potential exposure to changing global markets, technological shifts, carbon-intensive assets, and evolving trade regimes. This is particularly important for countries dependent on fossil fuel revenues, carbon-intensive exports, or climate-sensitive sectors. For example, analytical work in India has explored opportunities linked to renewable energy expansion, domestic manufacturing, and industrial transformation associated with clean technologies (Larsen, 2025).
Experiences in Chile, Uruguay, and Kenya also illustrate how early investments in renewable energy and low-carbon transport can shape long-term competitiveness and reduce exposure to future transition risks (IEA, 2026). To ensure a just transition, such risk assessment could also include cover the distributional and social dimensions of structural change (GGGI, 2025).
Guiding investment alignment
Third, transition pathways require substantial investments in infrastructure, energy systems, industrial upgrading, sustainable enterprise development, transport, skills development, and workforce transition and adaptation measures over multiple decades. Long-term strategies can help governments identify sequencing needs, investment gaps, and areas where public finance can help crowd in private investment. Integrating LT-LEDS analysis into public investment appraisal and budgeting processes can therefore help reduce the risk of carbon lock-in and stranded assets while improving consistency between long-term development objectives and near-term expenditure decisions (I4CE, 2022).
Costa Rica has used its long-term strategy to help structure investment planning and engagement with international climate finance (2050 Pathways Platform, 2026). In Guatemala, a financial dashboard linked to the national Low-emission Development Strategy has enabled the MoF to connect long-term transition priorities with fiscal metrics and budgeting discussions (I4CE, 2022). Morocco’s LT-LEDS set an objective to design a green tax system to enable a low-carbon transition for the industrial sector by incentivizing the increased use of clean technologies and R&D for low-carbon production methods; the LT-LEDS are also increasingly informing renewable energy investment pipelines and engagement with development finance institutions.
MoF entry points are in every LT-LEDS stage
Engagement at the initiation stage is not always possible if the process has already advanced or the MoF lacks a formal mandate. The practical aim is then to establish a formal institutional role as early as is feasible and to work backward into the analytical process rather than forward from a finished document; alignment with budget cycles is continuous rather than one-off, and engagement off cycle is often needed (see Table 1; World Bank, 2026). Box F1a(i).1 discusses how MoFs can navigate the political economy dynamics that can constrain engagement across different stages.
Table 1: Entry points for Ministries of Finance across the LT-LEDS cycle
Source: World Bank (2026).
The value of LT-LEDS lies not only in the strategy itself but also the processes established through its development and implementation
In countries such as Türkiye, the process of preparing LT‑LEDS has improved modeling and analytical capabilities. In addition, they can strengthen interministerial coordination and create platforms for dialogue between climate, finance, and sectoral institutions. In Peru, the LT-LEDS is linked to the national planning system. This reflects a broader shift: LT‑LEDS are increasingly understood not as one-off planning exercises but as iterative and adaptive frameworks that can support ongoing decision-making (2050 Pathways Platform, 2024b, 2025a; World Bank, 2026).
For MoFs, this provides a clear opportunity to strengthen their role in managing the transition. By engaging with LT‑LEDS as a process, they can use a substantial body of knowledge and analytical tools on transition pathways to expand work to inform fiscal frameworks, policy instruments, and investment decisions. This is increasingly relevant as countries advance sector-specific processes, such as transitioning away from fossil fuels or the COP30 Presidency on Enhancing Efforts Towards Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2023 roadmaps, which need to be integrated into economy-wide fiscal and macroeconomic frameworks (World Bank, 2026). In this sense, LT-LEDS can serve as a “north star” for economic transformation, providing long-term direction while enabling governments to continuously test, adjust, and align decisions as conditions evolve.
Barriers to action and ways to overcome them
Despite the recognition of MoFs’ relevance to climate action, several barriers continue to limit their ability to contribute effectively to the development and strengthening of climate plans. While there are distinct challenges depending on the context, a number of common constraints and solutions emerge across countries. The barriers below therefore affect all four Action Areas in Function 1, Participating in the development and implementation of climate and related strategies, rather than any single one.
Limited institutional coordination
Weak coordination between MoFs and Ministries of Environment or other designated lead agencies often results in delayed or narrowly scoped involvement of the MoF in climate planning processes. When planning and finance ministries are excluded from drafting and brought in only to validate finished work, they can neither own the strategy nor coordinate its implementation (World Bank, 2026).
Approach
Strengthen governance and coordination arrangements as a whole-of-government approach. Clear governance structures are critical to ensuring timely and meaningful participation of all relevant institutions throughout the climate planning process. In many cases, countries have already set up governance structures dedicated to NDC delivery, which can also be used for LT-LEDS and NAPs (see Capability 2, Coordination and collaboration for whole-of-economy climate action). These typically include a steering committee to provide political leadership and strategic direction; technical committee(s) to guide analysis, coordinate data, and ensure outputs respond to the needs of different ministries; and a core group responsible for day-to-day coordination.
Climate (Finance) Units and Country Platforms have proven to be effective mechanisms for strengthening inter-institutional coordination, particularly between MoFs, Ministries of Environment, line ministries, private sector, and other relevant sectoral stakeholders (see Capability 1, Formalizing governance structures and organizational set-up and Function 3, Leveraging international climate finance and reforming the global financial architecture).
Capacity and data constraints
Many MoFs face shortages in both human and technical capacity, including the tools and expertise to systematically analyze the links between climate change, economic performance, and fiscal outcomes. A survey conducted by the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action found that 78% of MoFs identify limited data availability as major constraint to advancing climate‑related analytical work (CFMCA, 2025a).
For NBSAPs specifically, indicators that directly measure biodiversity outcomes (such as ecosystem condition, species abundance, restoration areas, or biodiversity footprints) remain limited in mainstream financial decision-making, and biodiversity value is largely absent from GDP accounting, tax base projections, and medium-term expenditure frameworks (UNEP FI, 2024a).
Approach
Invest in capacity, data, and analytical tools. To engage effectively in climate planning processes, MoFs require sufficient human and technical capacity, underpinned by robust data systems and analytical tools (see Capability 3, Enhancing economic decision-making tools and data-driven analysis). This includes strengthening their ability to assess climate related risks, costs and benefits, and macrofiscal impacts as well as developing systems to monitor progress and track climate finance flows.
Investments in monitoring, reporting, and verification frameworks can enhance transparency, accountability, and evidence-based decision-making. Embedded advisory support models, which place climate finance experts within MoFs, have proven effective in facilitating knowledge transfer and sustaining capacity gains beyond the duration of technical assistance (Caldwell et al, 2022; see Function 1, Shaping 21st century industrial and innovation strategies, Function 2, Reforming fiscal policies and Function 3, Financing the transition through reforming the financial system and instruments).
Social dimensions are considered too late
Social and labor market implications are often identified too late in the planning cycle, largely due to lack of coordination with ministries responsible for labor, skills, social protection, and enterprise development. Climate plans may be technically sound but difficult to implement where workers, enterprises, and affected communities have not been engaged, where skills constraints are not anticipated, or where compensation and support measures are not costed.
Approach
Include social and labor-market analysis at the formulation stage. This can be addressed by working with Ministries of Labor and supported by structured engagement with social partners. Workers’ and employers’ organizations can provide early information on sectoral employment exposure, skills gaps, business preparedness, compliance costs, value-chain disruption, and informal-work realities. This improves the assumptions used in climate planning and helps ensure that compensation, training, enterprise support, and social protection measures are designed before implementation bottlenecks or opposition emerge (ILO, 2025).
Weak accountability and feedback mechanisms
Many countries lack robust processes and tools, such as monitoring, reporting, and verification systems and climate finance tracking frameworks, that integrate accountability, learning, and systematic feedback into the revision and strengthening of climate plans, particularly for adaptation finance.
Approach
Institutionalize monitoring, reporting, and verification systems and climate finance tracking frameworks, and build the feedback loops that connect them back into plan revision. Established public financial management instruments—climate budget tagging and tracking, disaster budget tagging, climate public expenditure and institutional reviews, and Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Climate assessments—can be extended beyond NAPs to LT-LEDS, NDCs, and NBSAPs, so that evidence on what is and is not working feeds systematically into successive rounds of planning.
Constraints in accessing climate finance
The complexity of the global climate finance architecture requires significant technical expertise and administrative capacity, posing particular challenges for smaller MoFs and those in Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS, 2022). For biodiversity finance, an additional constraint is the weakness of market signals: financial institutions still treat biodiversity primarily as a source of risk rather than as an opportunity for value creation, and the role of the private sector in achieving biodiversity targets is less clearly defined than for net zero targets, limiting capital allocation to nature-positive activities (UNEP FI, 2024a).
Approach
Develop climate finance and investment strategies, including within broader growth, development or Sustainable Development Goals strategies (see Function 1, Greening national development and sector strategies). MoFs are well placed to lead the development of climate finance and investment strategies that translate climate priorities into actionable and credible financing plans. This includes identifying domestic budgetary resources, coordinating public investment, improving enabling environments, mobilizing private capital, and improving access to international climate finance. The NDC Partnership and Green Climate Fund’s Climate Investment Planning and Mobilization Framework provides a structured, country-driven approach to institutional coordination, investment prioritization, and public-private financing (NDC Partnership, 2025).
Political economy pressures on engagement
MoFs face institutional disincentives to deep engagement in climate planning that go beyond capacity gaps: the political cost of quantifying fiscal constraints on NDC ambitions; the risk of conflict with sectoral ministries that carry stronger political weight; and the short horizons that electoral cycles impose on long-term strategy work (see Box F1a(i).1; World Bank, 2023).
Approach
MoFs can navigate these dynamics directly. On interministerial coordination, an MoF can use its center-of-government position to make climate objectives a condition of the budget and financing processes it manages.
On subsidy and pricing reform, sequencing compensation and social protection payments ahead of price increases—and reporting both the reform and the compensation transparently in public finance documents—builds the public trust needed to sustain the coalition behind reform (see Function 2, Transforming economic incentives through carbon pricing, subsidy reform and other fiscal policy measures).
Regarding electoral cycles, embedding commitments in legal and institutional frameworks and linking milestones to financing conditions with development partners allows commitments to persist across administrations. For example, Costa Rica is trying to write its Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy, the National Decarbonization Plan, into national law (World Bank, 2023).
Several global initiatives can support countries with the development and implementation of NDCs, NAPs, and LT-LEDS
These initiatives provide technical assistance, financing support, capacity building, and platforms for peer learning. The NDC Partnership, the NAP Global Network and the 2050 Pathways Platform provide country-tailored technical assistance, peer exchange, and financing support across NDCs, NAPs, and LT-LEDS, respectively. UNDP BIOFIN does the same for the financial side of NBSAPs.
The Initiative for Climate Action Transparency strengthens the tracking and reporting side through its Climate Finance Transparency Framework. The Country Platform Hub supports governments in designing and operationalizing country platforms that align national climate and development priorities with financing strategies and investor engagement, and the ILO is supporting countries with leveraging NDCs as a vehicle of a just transition (see also Function 3, Setting up country platforms).
Opportunities for action
It is beneficial for MoFs to treat active engagement in national climate and biodiversity planning as institutional responsibility, working in close collaboration with the relevant agencies on all four instruments. The following opportunities jointly cover all four Action Areas discussed in Function 1, Participating in the development and implementation of climate and related strategies.
Early engagement enables MoFs to embed fiscal, macroeconomic, and investment considerations from the outset. They can shape credible, implementable plans rather than merely validating or financing plans that have already been designed without them. MoFs can use their center-of-government position and convening power to improve coherence across LT-LEDS, NDCs, NBSAPs, and NAPs.
Modeling and developing scenarios can help assess the impacts of climate change as well as cost mitigation and adaptation policies. This includes transition-enabling measures such as reskilling, active labor-market policies, social protection, enterprise preparedness, and regional diversification where relevant.
This includes:
- Integrating climate action into national and sectoral development plans to improve alignment with wider economic priorities and maximize their impact (OECD, 2025b; see Function 1, Reforming economic strategy through shaping national development and climate plans).
- Translating climate planning instruments into actionable, credible climate finance and investment strategies, identifying domestic resources, sequencing public investments, mobilizing private capital, and improving access to international climate finance. This includes helping prepare project pipelines and strengthening the enabling environment for climate investments (see Function 1, Reforming economic strategy through shaping national development and climate plans).
- Translating commitments into budgets and medium-term expenditure frameworks, as well as other key MoFs levers such as fiscal policies, public procurement, and debt management (See Function 2, Reforming fiscal policies and Function 3, Financing the transition through reforming the financial system and instruments).
- Developing financing strategies and mobilizing funding (see Function 3, Financing the transition through reforming the financial system and instruments).
Strengthen monitoring and accountability, including by improving tracking of climate and biodiversity finance and expenditures to understand whether strategies are successful in mobilizing finance and feeding insights into successive revisions.
Focus on being included in relevant processes and increasing engagement over time as expertise and experience deepen. MoFs with limited staff and data have typically begun with the analytical entry points closest to existing budget and planning processes and widened engagement as capacity grows.
Real-world examples
The Gambia
Providing an example of institutional integration, The Gambia is co-drafting its Long-Term Climate-Neutral Development Strategy 2050 through a formal partnership between the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. This embeds its LT-LEDS directly within the medium-term Green Recovery-Focused National Development Plan and the Climate Prosperity Investment and Financing Strategy. Greater transparency and coordination across ministries have strengthened The Gambia’s ability to leverage multilateral development assistance, coordinate international donor programming, and deploy targeted fiscal instruments effectively.
Guatemala
The National Low-Carbon Development Strategy (Estrategia de Desarrollo con Bajas Emisiones) demonstrates how technical tools can bridge long-term strategies directly with active public finance management. To prevent the strategy from becoming a disconnected policy document, Guatemala’s MoF co-developed the National Low-Carbon Development Strategy Financial Dashboard. Initially developed on empirical practices in France from the Institute for Climate Economics this framework was implemented by the MoF with technical guidance from the Climate Lead Group to translate qualitative sectoral mitigation pathways into standardized fiscal indicators (I4CE, 2022). By integrating these metrics directly into national budgetary planning processes, the MoF can evaluate funding gaps, project fiscal impacts, and systematically direct domestic and international capital toward high-impact development objectives. This process included intensive co-development and training sessions with staff from relevant secretariats under the MoF (I4CE, 2022; see 2050 Pathways contribution to the Coalition Compendium of Practice, forthcoming).
United Kingdom
Launching its Net Zero Strategy in 2021 with the goal of lowering greenhouse gas emissions to “net zero” by 2050, the UK set out its vision for a decarbonized economy. It detailed guidelines and steps to take across key sectors to keep the UK on track for its NDCs and carbon budgets, with five-year statutory caps on total emissions set by the independent Climate Change Committee. The strategy sets targets to reduce emissions for each sector and capture the remaining emissions with green carbon capture technologies or natural carbon sinks. From the beginning, it was developed with support from the Treasury, which assessed the fiscal implications and risks of the transition and the social impacts of the strategy; it was also responsible for the investment needs assessment, including additional public and private capital investments required to achieve net zero. Through publishing the Net Zero Review (2021), the Treasury assessed the costs and benefits of the transition, impacts on households and government finances, and the economy’s competitiveness.
Fiji
The MoF’s Climate Change and International Cooperation Division was responsible for developing the LT-LEDS and now holds the main coordination role for its implementation. The LT-LEDS identifies a high-ambition net zero vision for 2050, as established in the country’s national development plan, and contains a non-exhaustive list of prioritized actions with high-level costing and timelines. It is closely aligned with the NDC and gives substantial coverage to adaptation in the form of climate-resilient development. The MoF also acted as the facilitator between donors, climate funds, and sector recipients of climate finance to support integrated proposal design, funding alignment with priorities, and efficient implementation arrangements.
2050 Pathways (Marcela Jaramillo)
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