Function 1 · Reforming economic strategy through shaping national development and climate plans

National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) 

DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION
Assessing adaptation priorities and financing needs and connecting them with development planning and the budget to protect livelihoods and economic activity.
16 min readAdaptation & ResilienceBudget execution, treasury, accounting and reportingBudget preparation and planningLeadership, coordination and institutional developmentMacro-fiscal policy, economic strategy, forecasting and fiscal risk analysis

IN BRIEF National Adaptation Plans can turn climate risk into a quantified fiscal exposure. Where Ministries of Finance engage actively, that exposure becomes something they can price, budget for, and insure against.  
This Action Area covers:  
• How National Adaptation Plans function in practice.  
• The concrete entry points through which they can turn adaptation planning into a working part of fiscal risk management. It also discusses.  
• The importance of localizing adaptation action.  

Context and role of Ministries of Finance

More frequent and damaging extreme weather events are making adaptation an urgent fiscal priority for Ministries of Finance (MoFs). Floods, droughts, and other extreme weather events harm sovereign assets, increase public debt, and impair sovereign credit ratings, restricting access to finance (see Part A, The role of Ministries of Finance in navigating the transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient, and nature-positive economy). Climate shocks generate budgetary pressure through disaster response, infrastructure repair, health costs, lost productivity, and social protection spending, making adaptation not only an environmental concern but also a core dimension of fiscal sustainability. 

By 2050, climate impacts could reduce average GDP per capita by 3%–15%, with people in low- and lower-middle-income countries already 4%–12% poorer due to temperature changes and sea level rise (Rising, 2026). In Pacific Small Island Developing States, coastal protection alone would cost 8–9% of GDP annually, depending on risk tolerance. For example, total annual public adaptation costs exceed 25% of GDP for Kiribati and are around 17% for Tuvalu and 14% for Vanuatu—far beyond the fiscal capacity of these countries (ESCAP, 2025). 

Adaptation finance has grown but remains severely inadequate 

Total adaptation financing was only around US$65bn in 2023 (CPI, 2025), far below estimated needs. The UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025 puts annual adaptation costs in developing countries at US$310bn per year by 2035, of which Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States account for US$36.7bn per year (UNEP, 2025). Parties at COP30 called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035. 

National Adaptation Plans are a key tool to accelerate progress 

Formally established in 2010 under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) process enables countries, particularly developing countries, to identify and address medium- and long-term adaptation priorities (NAP Global Network, 2020). By analyzing current and future vulnerabilities, NAPs give MoFs a basis to prioritize adaptation options and to integrate adaptation into national planning, decision-making, and budgeting, increasing the resilience of public finances (ibid.). 

The updated NAP Technical Guidelines (LEG/UNFCCC, 2025) draw a distinction relevant to MoFs: 

  • Managing climate risk by identifying hazards and reducing exposure. 
  • Managing adaptation benefits through generating measurable returns in health, food security, employment, and resilience. 

Both lenses are needed: the risk lens prioritizes vulnerable populations and high-exposure geographies; the benefits lens aligns NAP priorities with national development goals and helps identify ”no-regret” options that reduce risks and improve lives regardless of future climate scenarios. Progress can be tracked through the Belém Adaptation Indicators (see Box F1a(iii).1). 

MoF involvement in NAPs has so far been limited, often coming only at the final stages of planning 

Only 79 NAPs have been communicated to the UNFCCC (NAP Global Network, 2026) and most countries remain focused on planning rather than implementation. Engagement is growing, however: the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action established an adaptation workstream in early 2022, with a first survey showing some members beginning to build adaptation into their policy analysis and tools (CFMCA, 2022).  

A more recent survey of 59 MoFs confirms this trajectory: 48% are now actively involved in shaping national adaptation and resilience plans, and a further 28% are considering it. However, 44% have not estimated public expenditure or financing needs for adaptation, so the financial implications remain unquantified in most countries (CFMCA, 2025a). 

Box F1a(iii).1. How the Belém Adaptation Indicators can help MoFs manage climate risk and mobilize adaptation finance 

Agreed at COP30, the Belém Adaptation Indicators provide countries with a voluntary framework to track collective progress on the targets of the Paris Agreement’s Global Goal on Adaptation. The 59 indicators include sectors (water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, livelihoods, and cultural heritage) alongside processes (impact, vulnerability and risk assessment, planning, means of implementation, and monitoring, evaluation, and learning). There are no reporting obligations, but they can offer a practical entry point for strengthening fiscal risk management and adaptation investment planning. 

Strengthening fiscal risk assessment. For MoFs, the Indicators offer an outcome-oriented framework for integrating adaptation into fiscal and investment planning. They allow moving beyond tracking expenditures and toward assessing whether adaptation investments are effectively and efficiently reducing vulnerability and strengthening resilience over time. The Indicators can be used to strengthen fiscal risk assessment by identifying where climate vulnerabilities are likely to generate future budgetary pressures, revealing limited early warning coverage or inadequate climate-proofing of infrastructure, and signaling heightened exposure to costly shocks. 

Embedding these Indicators into fiscal risk statements, debt sustainability analyses, and macrofiscal frameworks enables MoFs to anticipate contingent liabilities and shift from reactive crisis spending to preventive, resilience-building investments, supporting more stable public finances and reducing long-term budget volatility. 

Operationalizing adaptation in public financial management. The Indicators can be linked to budget classifications and project screening, alongside tagging and appraisal instruments, serving as an evidence base to prioritize resilience-enhancing sectors and support expenditure decisions within constrained fiscal space (see Function 2, Reforming fiscal policies). This integration enables more strategic resource allocation, aligns adaptation objectives with national development planning, and positions adaptation as a central component of fiscal sustainability rather than a stand-alone environmental concern. 

Supporting adaptation finance mobilization and accountability. The Belém Indicators include implementation elements like finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building. Reporting against them internationally could strengthen accountability for providing the means of implementation and help track progress toward goals such as the call for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035.  

Credible outcome-based metrics may also support the structuring and mobilization of financial instruments. They can underpin results-based finance models, inform the structuring of sovereign bonds focused on resilience and blended-finance instruments, and strengthen alignment between national adaptation priorities and multilateral climate funds. This could reduce fragmentation across funding sources and improve coherence between domestic fiscal systems and international climate finance flows.  

Source: Based on a contribution by Pan Ei Ei Phyoe and Cristina Rumbaitis del Rio (UN Foundation). 

Note: The detailed methodologies and metadata underpinning the Belém Adaptation Indicators remain under development and are not expected to be finalized before November 2027. 

MoFs have an important role to play in every stage of NAPs 

In particular, they can work with the lead agency, such as the Ministry of Environment, by leading or supporting the following processes as appropriate. 

Costing adaptation actions 

First, most NAPs identify adaptation priorities but stop short of costing them; of 58 submitted NAPs analyzed, only 33 indicate the cost of implementing adaptation actions (UNFCCC, 2024). This is partly because costing adaptation is genuinely difficult: benefits materialize as avoided losses rather than direct gains, attribution is hard to establish, and projections rest on uncertain scenarios. 

A structured approach helps. Cost estimation should cover three dimensions: the cost of implementing priority actions; the quantified return on adaptation investment, anchored in counterfactual modeling of fiscal exposure without action; and the broader benefits of adaptation including resilience dividends and co-benefits (LEG/UNFCCC, 2025). UNFCCC sectoral guidelines and the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative budget integration methodology provide practical guidance on how to estimate each of these dimensions across sectors such as agriculture, water, infrastructure, and health.  

Prioritizing actions 

Second, once costs and benefits are estimated, the question is how to compare and rank options. Cost–benefit analysis is appropriate where benefits can be monetized; multi-criteria decision analysis is preferable where quantification breaks down or where equity, social inclusion, and ecosystem co-benefits must be weighted alongside financial returns. In practice, the two are often combined, with monetary estimates feeding into a broader multi-criteria scorecard. Finally, because point estimates are unreliable under climate uncertainty, prioritization can benefit from sensitivity analysis across multiple scenarios and iterative review as projections and economic conditions change.  

Mobilizing private sector involvement and financing 

Third, engaging the private sector early in the NAP process builds awareness and alignment. It can act as both financier and implementer, supply data for monitoring and evaluation, and be consulted on barriers to private adaptation finance (IISD, 2022). MoFs are well placed to design enabling conditions, such as regulatory frameworks, risk-sharing instruments, and blended finance structures that make adaptation investments attractive to private actors.  

Tracking adaptation financial flows 

Fourth, MoFs are well placed to set up tracking systems. They may start with external finance where tracking of domestic and private finance is less established (IISD, 2022). Established public financial management instruments support this, notably climate budget tagging and tracking and disaster budget tagging; climate public expenditure and institutional review; and climate public expenditure and financial accountability. However, disaster budget tagging remains underused, methods are not standardized, and evidence on the real-world impact of tagging is limited (CFMCA, 2025a). The Belém Adaptation Indicators provide a results-based framework through collaboration between line ministries and statistical authorities (see Box F1a(iii).1).  

Mainstreaming NAPs into national planning and budgeting 

Fifth, MoFs are responsible for ensuring NAP priorities survive the annual budget negotiation cycle rather than remaining aspirational. This means working with line ministries to: 

  • Map NAP priorities to mandates, budget submissions, and medium-term expenditure frameworks. 

Embedding NAP priorities in the medium-term fiscal framework, which determines the aggregate resource envelope through measurable climate KPIs, is the most reliable mechanism for translating planning commitments into funded action (UNDP, 2025).  

Anchoring fiscal risk assessment in the NAP process 

Sixth, climate damage modeling can make the cost of inaction visible alongside the cost of investment, giving MoFs the analytical basis to justify adaptation expenditure. Macrofinancial modeling tools (e.g., GEMMES) show that without adaptation, climate impacts transmitted through agriculture, infrastructure, and labor productivity can generate GDP losses of several percentage points. As there are disproportionate effects on low-income households, reactive spending is no substitute for supply-side adaptation. Damage modeling can sit inside the MoF’s own macroeconomic framework. Analysis of the returns on adaptation investment, based on counterfactual modeling of fiscal exposure, can be built into NAP design (see Function 2, Managing the fiscal risks of cascading contingent liabilities and Function 3, Providing disaster risk finance and insurance for all). 

Climate shocks can increase demand for income support, unemployment protection, healthcare, and emergency assistance, while the transition process itself may create temporary income losses for affected workers, households, and enterprises. The same analysis can extend to social protection adequacy: stress-testing whether existing safety nets can absorb climate shocks and designing compensation mechanisms where they cannot. The NAP process can also be used to both evaluate whether existing social protection systems can respond to climate and transition shocks, and link adaptation planning with scalable, fiscally sustainable social protection mechanisms.  

Financing nature-based solutions 

Seventh, nature-based solutions offer cost-effective adaptation options that MoFs have a direct interest in financing. Measures such as mangrove restoration, wetland protection, and watershed management are inherently more flexible than hard infrastructure. Because ecosystems evolve naturally, nature-based solutions allow iterative adjustment over time as climate change intensifies, avoiding the expensive fiscal lock-in and high rebuilding costs of concrete and steel systems. This adaptive capacity reduces long-term liability, as rigid technical solutions risk creating a false sense of security that worsens economic exposure if they fail (UNEP, 2022b; IPCC 2022). 

Ecosystems also generate biodiversity co-benefits, strengthening NAPs’ coherence with National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (see Function 1, National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans). MoFs can embed safeguards and monitoring into nature-based solutions, financing to guard against maladaptation risks such as the biodiversity or social risks of monoculture planting and land grabbing, which rise with the effects of climate change.  

Localizing NAP priorities to subnational and community levels 

Climate impacts are often felt first at the local level. However, capacity gaps, weak local data, and the absence of harmonized adaptation standards mean that subnational and community needs are routinely underrepresented in national budgeting processes. MoFs can account for this through decentralized financing mechanisms, localized risk assessment, and stronger subnational planning capacity. (LEG/UNFCCC, 2025; see also Box F1a(iii).2) 

Box F1a(iii).2. The importance of addressing adaptation at local level  

Climate change is a global challenge, yet its impacts are felt first and foremost at the local level: in the villages and towns with low adaptive capacity and where extremes strike hardest. This matters for MoFs because more severe and frequent disasters like floods, droughts, and heatwaves disrupt economic activity, reduce productivity, destroy assets, and displace families, threatening macroeconomic stability, growth, employment, and public revenues. When local systems fail, value chains are interrupted, businesses lose profits, and entire communities that were already vulnerable can face increased poverty and be more susceptible to being displaced. Left unaddressed, these disruptions aggregate into macrocritical fiscal stresses, undermining national budgets and economic prospects.  

MoFs are uniquely positioned to ensure that adaptation is planned, designed, and implemented where it matters most: at the subnational and community level. By embedding localization into climate adaptation planning and finance strategies, MoFs can strengthen resilience in productive sectors, secure livelihoods, and protect economies from systemic shocks that originate in local climate impacts. Such localization aligns fiscal planning with real risks on the ground, supporting resilient infrastructure, social safety nets, and economic participation across diverse geographies. Practically, this means enabling local consultations and considering local solutions when initiatives are taken to promote adaptation.  

Significant barriers persist in addressing adaptation at the local level. Lack of access to finance at the local level is one of the most pervasive challenges, especially in low-income countries where the cost of capital is high and communities struggle to mobilize capital for locally tailored adaptation measures. Others include lack of capacity and technical expertise, weak data, and limited access to risk assessment tools. 

Some barriers can be addressed by other authorities, but fiscal planning processes and policy development do also play a role. This is especially true if MoFs are focused on national priorities overseeing localized vulnerabilities and the differentiated needs of rural or high-risk areas. This includes the risk of disruption to local care infrastructure, including schools, health facilities, and community services, which climate shocks routinely damage or render inaccessible (Trelegan et al., 2026). 

MoFs can address these barriers through a combination of fiscal tools, institutional practice, and cross-ministerial engagement. This includes:  

  • Integrating localized risk assessments into national budgeting processes so that subnational priorities inform public investment decisions, ensuring resources flow to the most climate-vulnerable areas.  
  • Supporting decentralized adaptation financing mechanisms, including grants and blended finance structures that amplify multistakeholder partnerships, de-risk investments, improve local access to capital, and incentivize community-driven solutions.  
  • Building MoF capacity for adaptation appraisal and local stakeholder engagement, including training on climate risk data and inclusive fiscal policy design, with a focus on community consultation and locally led planning and implementation. MoFs can also assess how well their own climate functions support localization and work with other ministries on related initiatives.  

Source: Based on a contribution by Mattias Söderberg and John Riungu (DanChurchAid).  

Acting on these responsibilities requires a dedicated financing strategy 

The three building blocks of a dedicated financing strategy are: identifying the financing gap; mapping available sources (domestic public and private finance as well as international private and public climate funds); and developing the operational steps to access them, including capacity building, relationship development and project preparation (IISD, 2022). Risk layering provides the instrument logic: matching contingency reserves, contingent credit lines, sovereign insurance, and catastrophe bonds to the frequency and severity of shocks secures liquidity at lowest cost, while protection-gap analysis quantifies residual liabilities across government, business, and households (CFMCA, 2025a). 

The Belém Adaptation Indicators can further support mobilization by underpinning results-based finance and informing both resilience-focused sovereign bonds and blended finance structures. Taken together, these tools position the MoF not as a passive recipient of adaptation plans produced elsewhere, but as a central actor in designing, funding, and delivering the resilience investments that fiscal sustainability increasingly demands (Valdecantos and Espagne, 2025). 

Barriers to action and ways to overcome them 

Despite the recognition of MoFs’ relevance to climate action, several barriers continue to limit their ability to contribute effectively to the development and strengthening of climate plans. While there are distinct challenges depending on the context, a number of common constraints and solutions emerge across countries. The barriers below therefore affect all four Action Areas in Function 1, Participating in the development and implementation of climate and related strategies, rather than any single one. 

Limited institutional coordination

Weak coordination between MoFs and Ministries of Environment or other designated lead agencies often results in delayed or narrowly scoped involvement of the MoF in climate planning processes. When planning and finance ministries are excluded from drafting and brought in only to validate finished work, they can neither own the strategy nor coordinate its implementation (World Bank, 2026).  

Approach

Strengthen governance and coordination arrangements as a whole-of-government approach. Clear governance structures are critical to ensuring timely and meaningful participation of all relevant institutions throughout the climate planning process. In many cases, countries have already set up governance structures dedicated to NDC delivery, which can also be used for LT-LEDS and NAPs (see Capability 2, Coordination and collaboration for whole-of-economy climate action). These typically include a steering committee to provide political leadership and strategic direction; technical committee(s) to guide analysis, coordinate data, and ensure outputs respond to the needs of different ministries; and a core group responsible for day-to-day coordination. 

Climate (Finance) Units and Country Platforms have proven to be effective mechanisms for strengthening inter-institutional coordination, particularly between MoFs, Ministries of Environment, line ministries, private sector, and other relevant sectoral stakeholders (see Capability 1, Formalizing governance structures and organizational set-up and Function 3, Leveraging international climate finance and reforming the global financial architecture). 

Capacity and data constraints

Many MoFs face shortages in both human and technical capacity, including the tools and expertise to systematically analyze the links between climate change, economic performance, and fiscal outcomes. A survey conducted by the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action found that 78% of MoFs identify limited data availability as major constraint to advancing climate‑related analytical work (CFMCA, 2025a).  

For NBSAPs specifically, indicators that directly measure biodiversity outcomes (such as ecosystem condition, species abundance, restoration areas, or biodiversity footprints) remain limited in mainstream financial decision-making, and biodiversity value is largely absent from GDP accounting, tax base projections, and medium-term expenditure frameworks (UNEP FI, 2024a).  

Approach

Invest in capacity, data, and analytical tools. To engage effectively in climate planning processes, MoFs require sufficient human and technical capacity, underpinned by robust data systems and analytical tools (see Capability 3, Enhancing economic decision-making tools and data-driven analysis). This includes strengthening their ability to assess climate related risks, costs and benefits, and macrofiscal impacts as well as developing systems to monitor progress and track climate finance flows. 

Investments in monitoring, reporting, and verification frameworks can enhance transparency, accountability, and evidence-based decision-making. Embedded advisory support models, which place climate finance experts within MoFs, have proven effective in facilitating knowledge transfer and sustaining capacity gains beyond the duration of technical assistance (Caldwell et al, 2022; see Function 1, Shaping 21st century industrial and innovation strategies, Function 2, Reforming fiscal policies and Function 3, Financing the transition through reforming the financial system and instruments). 

Social dimensions are considered too late

Social and labor market implications are often identified too late in the planning cycle, largely due to lack of coordination with ministries responsible for labor, skills, social protection, and enterprise development. Climate plans may be technically sound but difficult to implement where workers, enterprises, and affected communities have not been engaged, where skills constraints are not anticipated, or where compensation and support measures are not costed.  

Approach
APPROACH

Include social and labor-market analysis at the formulation stage. This can be addressed by working with Ministries of Labor and supported by structured engagement with social partners. Workers’ and employers’ organizations can provide early information on sectoral employment exposure, skills gaps, business preparedness, compliance costs, value-chain disruption, and informal-work realities. This improves the assumptions used in climate planning and helps ensure that compensation, training, enterprise support, and social protection measures are designed before implementation bottlenecks or opposition emerge (ILO, 2025). 

Weak accountability and feedback mechanisms

Many countries lack robust processes and tools, such as monitoring, reporting, and verification systems and climate finance tracking frameworks, that integrate accountability, learning, and systematic feedback into the revision and strengthening of climate plans, particularly for adaptation finance. 

Approach

Institutionalize monitoring, reporting, and verification systems and climate finance tracking frameworks, and build the feedback loops that connect them back into plan revision. Established public financial management instruments—climate budget tagging and tracking, disaster budget tagging, climate public expenditure and institutional reviews, and Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Climate assessments—can be extended beyond NAPs to LT-LEDS, NDCs, and NBSAPs, so that evidence on what is and is not working feeds systematically into successive rounds of planning. 

Constraints in accessing climate finance

The complexity of the global climate finance architecture requires significant technical expertise and administrative capacity, posing particular challenges for smaller MoFs and those in Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS, 2022). For biodiversity finance, an additional constraint is the weakness of market signals: financial institutions still treat biodiversity primarily as a source of risk rather than as an opportunity for value creation, and the role of the private sector in achieving biodiversity targets is less clearly defined than for netzero targets, limiting capital allocation to nature-positive activities (UNEP FI, 2024a). 

Approach

Develop climate finance and investment strategies, including within broader growth, development or Sustainable Development Goals strategies(see Function 1, Greening national development and sector strategies). MoFs are well placed to lead the development of climate finance and investment strategies that translate climate priorities into actionable and credible financing plans. This includes identifying domestic budgetary resources, coordinating public investment, improving enabling environments, mobilizing private capital, and improving access to international climate finance. The NDC Partnership and Green Climate Fund’s Climate Investment Planning and Mobilization Framework provides a structured, country-driven approach to institutional coordination, investment prioritization, and public-private financing (NDC Partnership, 2025). 

Political economy pressures on engagement

MoFs face institutional disincentives to deep engagement in climate planning that go beyond capacity gaps: the political cost of quantifying fiscal constraints on NDC ambitions; the risk of conflict with sectoral ministries that carry stronger political weight; and the short horizons that electoral cycles impose on long-term strategy work (see Box F1a(i).1; World Bank, 2023). 

Approach

MoFs can navigate these dynamics directly. On interministerial coordination, an MoF can use its center-of-government position to make climate objectives a condition of the budget and financing processes it manages. 

On subsidy and pricing reform, sequencing compensation and social protection payments ahead of price increases—and reporting both the reform and the compensation transparently in public finance documents—builds the public trust needed to sustain the coalition behind reform (see Function 2, Transforming economic incentives through carbon pricing, subsidy reform and other fiscal policy measures). 

Regarding electoral cycles, embedding commitments in legal and institutional frameworks and linking milestones to financing conditions with development partners allows commitments to persist across administrations. For example, Costa Rica is trying to write its Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy, the National Decarbonization Plan, into national law (World Bank, 2023). 

Several global initiatives can support countries with the development and implementation of NDCs, NAPs, and LT-LEDS

These initiatives provide technical assistance, financing support, capacity building, and platforms for peer learning. The NDC Partnership, the NAP Global Network and the 2050 Pathways Platform provide country-tailored technical assistance, peer exchange, and financing support across NDCs, NAPs, and LT-LEDS, respectively. UNDP BIOFIN does the same for the financial side of NBSAPs. 

The Initiative for Climate Action Transparency strengthens the tracking and reporting side through its Climate Finance Transparency Framework. The Country Platform Hub supports governments in designing and operationalizing country platforms that align national climate and development priorities with financing strategies and investor engagement, and the ILO is supporting countries with leveraging NDCs as a vehicle of a just transition (see also Function 3, Setting up country platforms). 

Opportunities for action 

It is beneficial for MoFs to treat active engagement in national climate and biodiversity planning as institutional responsibility, working in close collaboration with the relevant agencies on all four instruments. The following opportunities jointly cover all four Action Areas discussed in Function 1, Participating in the development and implementation of climate and related strategies.  

ENGAGE EARLY AND SUPPORT ALIGNMENT

Early engagement enables MoFs to embed fiscal, macroeconomic, and investment considerations from the outset. They can shapecredible, implementable plans rather than merely validating or financing plans that have already been designed without them. MoFscan use their center-of-government position and convening power to improve coherence across LT-LEDS, NDCs, NBSAPs, and NAPs. 

SUPPORT INSTRUMENT PREPARATION

Modeling and developing scenarios can help assess the impacts of climate change as well as cost mitigation and adaptation policies.This includes transition-enabling measures such as reskilling, active labor-market policies, social protection, enterprise preparedness,and regional diversification where relevant.  

SUPPORT INSTRUMENT IMPLEMENTATION

This includes:  

  • Translating climate planning instruments into actionable, credible climate finance and investment strategies, identifying domestic resources, sequencing public investments, mobilizing private capital, and improving access to international climate finance. This includes helping prepare project pipelines and strengthening the enabling environment for climate investments (see Function 1, Reforming economic strategy through shaping national development and climate plans). 
SUPPORT INSTRUMENT EVALUATION

Strengthen monitoring and accountability, including by improving tracking of climate and biodiversity finance and expenditures to understand whether strategies are successful in mobilizing finance and feeding insights into successive revisions. 

BUILD ENGAGEMENT IN STAGES WHERE CAPACITY IS LIMITED

Focus on being included in relevant processes and increasing engagement over time as expertise and experience deepen. MoFs with limited staff and data have typically begun with the analytical entry points closest to existing budget and planning processes and widened engagement as capacity grows. 

Real-world examples 

While MoFs have been slower to get involved in NAPs than in Nationally Determined Contributions and Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategies, there are encouraging signs of their leadership on both planning and implementation. 

Togo 

The Ministry of Economy, Finance and Development Planning is part of an interministerial National Adaptation Plan Committee, established in 2014 and led by the Ministry of Environmental and Forest Resources. They are working closely to ensure that adaptation is mainstreamed into national policies, including the Nationally Determined Contributions and the country’s development goals. The Ministry of Economy, Finance and Development Planning is taking steps to align the NAP process with its national development and budget planning cycle, identifying key entry points for integrating adaptation into the budget process. As part of this, members of the Medium-Term Budgeting Framework Committee also received training in how to integrate adaptation into the budget process (GIZ, 2019). 

Fiji 

The Ministry of Economy has developed a methodology to provide rapid and comparable cost estimates for the 160 prioritized actions in Fiji’s NAP for 2021 to 2025. This National Adaptation Plan Costing Methodology follows a pragmatic, bottom-up engineering approach that determines the total cost of broad adaptation measures by adding up individual activity costs. Compared to complex “full cost” economic models that require extensive data and technical expertise, this spreadsheet-based tool is well suited to Fiji’s context due to its low data input requirements. It is structured around a two-phased framework: Phase 1 is a rapid evaluation of the five-year NAP timeframe; and Phase 2 is an optional advanced estimation using sophisticated economic tools like cost–benefit analysis for major investments.   

Operationally, government agencies follow a structured six-step process to break down general NAP measures into specific activities, input data, and document results using a standardized summary template. To maximize flexibility, the tool offers dual costing options: a calculated-cost approach based on individual resource components like labor or materials; and an aggregate-cost approach using ready-made estimates from prior budgets or project reports. To ensure consistency across ministries, the methodology incorporates standardized cost factors, including dedicated budgeting for gender integration. Finally, by identifying and subtracting existing funding from domestic budgets or international donors, the tool calculates the precise net adaptation funding gap to simplify updates to the public financial management system (Government of Fiji, 2020). 

Contributors

Agence Française de Développement (Antoine Godin, Etienne Espagne); Asian Development Bank (Nanki Kaur); UN Foundation (Pan Ei Ei Phyoe, Cristina Rumbaitis del Rio)

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Take this Function with you — a formatted PDF of the overview and its action areas.